Articles

This Article analyzes the economic incentives countries face in selecting an antitrust policy. It demonstrates that, in the presence of international trade, antitrust policies chosen by national governments will generally not lead to an outcome that is desirable from an international perspective. Professor Guzman identifies the reasons why national policies are different from the optimal global policy and shows how the direction of the deviation from the optimal policy depends on trade patterns and the extent to which national laws are applied extraterritorially. The author concludes that; although international agreement is not impossible, the prospects for substantive cooperation on international antitrust policy are slight. Unlike trade policy, an international agreement on antitrust policy would benefit some countries at the expense of others. The Article identifies tie potential winners and losers from such an agreement and points out that because international compensatory transfer payments are unlikely, an agreement will be difficult to achieve. Recognizing that agreement is nevertheless desirable to avoid welfare losses associated with a noncooperative approach to international antitrust policy Professor Guzman analyzes the fora in which antitrust agreements are most likely to be negotiated and assesses tire likelihood of success in each forum. Because concessions in other areas of negotiation may be necessary to compensate countries that will suffer a loss under a cooperative antitrust policy, the analysis suggests that negotiations on antitrust policy should be combined with the negotiations of other issues.

In Graham v. Connor, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment effectively preempts any substantive due process claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force in the course of an arrest. Graham‘s disarmingly simple rationale was that an explicit textual provision trumps a more general constitutional provision. Professor Massaro argues that this rationale, as subsequently invoked by the Supreme Court and expansively applied by the lower courts in First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment cases, may ultimately have a pervasive impact on substantive due process. At the very least, the logic of Graham requires that substantive due process be confined to its current doctrinal limits. Carried to its furthest extreme, Graham requires overruling the Court’s substantive due process “unenumerated rights” caselaw altogether. The author argues that Graham is an analytical and doctrinal oddity, inconsistent with well-accepted and regularly enforced principles of constitutional interpretation, that should be overruled rather than used to revive Hugo Black’s “jot for jot” account of substantive due process.

This Article concludes a series by these authors and Professors J. Gregory Sidak and Daniel F. Spulber, published last year in this journal. Here, Professors Baumol and Merrill address the issues surrounding the pricing of local phone services to long distance rivals, clarifying their points of agreement and disagreement with Sidak and Spulber. In their previous articles, Sidak and Spulber argued that the movement toward competition in local telephone service should be accompanied by substantial compensation to existing local telephone carriers, a view that Baumol and Merrill do not share. Rather, they note three points of disagreement between Sidak and Spulber and themselves. First, they maintain that Sidak and Spulber use an incorrect formula to determine whether the transition from regulated monopoly to competition requires compensation. Second, they argue that neither the Compensation Clause nor the regulatory contract requires compensation to take place ex ante. Finally, they do not believe that the magnitude of fixed and common costs will be significant in local telephony.

The Second Amendment is widely seen as quite unusual, because it has a justification clause as well as an operative clause Professor Volokh points out that this structure was actually quite commonplace in American constitutions of the Framing era: State Bills of Rights contained justification clauses for many of the rights they secured. Looking at these state provisions, he suggests, can shed light on how the similarly structured Second Amendment should be interpreted. In particular, the provisions show that constitutional rights will often—and for good reason—be written in ways that are to some extent overinclusive and to some extent underinclusive with respect to their stated justifications.

Professors Kahan and Silberman offer a doctrinal and policy critique of the Ninth Circuit’s 1997 remand decision in Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (Matsushita II), which held that class counsel in a state court class action failed to adequately represent the class, and thus the class was not bound by the global settlement approved by the state court. As a result of the Matsushita II decision, absent class members have an unfettered ability to collaterally attack the “adequacy” of their representation by class counsel. The authors argue that this holding, premised on a misreading of the Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, threatens to impede both state and federal class action settlements, create the potential for multiple and wasteful litigation of the issue of “adequacy of representation,” and motivate a new kind of forum shopping in the class action context. Although multi-jurisdictional class actions give rise to potential “plaintiff shopping” and “forum shopping” abuses, the authors contend that a broad right to collateral attack created by Matsushita II is not a good way to deal with these problems. In place of the Ninth Circuit rule, Professors Kahan and Silberman propose providing incentives to all parties to participate in the settlement action coupled with a narrower, process-based standard for collateral attack.

One of the main and ongoing problems plaguing the American jury system has been ensuring that juries in civil and criminal trials are truly representative of the communities in which they serve. Historically, minorities have been disproportionately excluded from jury service. This shortfall results from a combination of factors at each stage of the juror identification process. At the jury pool stage, juror notification methods often fail to identify or reach minorities for tie simple reason that minorities generally are poorer and more transient. At the venire stage, those minorities who actually receive notification report to the courthouse at a lower rate than the majority because they ignore the summons and claim hardship more often. Finally, at the petit jury stage, prosecutors and other litigants typically eliminate most if not all, minority venirepersons through the use of both peremptory and for cause strikes. Authors Edward Adams and Christian Lane take on this problem of underrepresentation on juries by focusing on tie latter stage of jury selection—the use of peremptory strikes. They argue that prosecutors often use peremptories in a discriminatory manner to eliminate potential jurors based on their race. The authors argue that although it intended to remedy tie striking of minority venirepersons for racial reasons, the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky failed to deter the practice effectively. Batson prohibits the striking of jurors based on race, but allows the use of peremptory challenges with a “race neutral” explanation. Dean Adams and Mr. Lane propose a new method of jury selection which dispenses with peremptory challenges and which, they assert, will rid the jury selection process of discrimination. Borrowing a concept front corporate law, they propose a new method based on a cumulative voting model The authors contend that this new method for impaneling juries is free of the pitfalls that plague the current system and other alternative proposals. They argue that adopting their method will result in more representative juries.

In this Article, Professors Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei analyze the functions served by the law of trusts and ask, first, whether the basic tools of contract and agency law could fulfill the same functions and, second, whether trust law provides benefits that are not provided by the law of corporations. The authors’ analysis is motivated in part by the increasing interest in the trust, a familiar feature of common-law jurisdictions, in a number of civil law countries, and in part by the important role that trusts, for example pension and mutual finds, have come to play in capital markets. The authors conclude that the important contribution of trust law lies not in its well-recognized role of ordering, via default rules of contract, the relationships among parties to the trust; rather, the principal benefit of trust law lies in its ordering of relationships between these parties and third parties with whom they deal, relationships that cannot be rearranged easily by contract. Particularly, trust law allows the parties to the trust to partition off a discrete set of assets for separate treatment in relationships formed with creditors. The essential role of the trust, therefore, is to perform a property law-like, rather than a contract law-like, function. Moreover, the trust provides flexibility in organizational structure unavailable under even the more liberal business corporation statutes. The authors close by noting the convergence of trust and corporate law and questioning whether the roles performed by the two organizational types could just as well be served by a single legal form.

The apparent tension between judicial review and the democratic process—what Alexander Bickel dubbed the “countermajoritarian difficulty”—has been the focal point of modern constitutional scholarship. At the same time, however, scholars have rarely examined the origins of the countermajoritarian difficulty. In this Article—the first of a three-part series—Professor Friedman undertakes such an examination. Although countermajoritarian criticism of the Supreme Court has surfaced to some extent throughout our nation’s history, Professor Friedman’s historical analysis identifies four factors that tend to presage the prominence of such criticism at any given time. By studying criticism of the Court during Jeffersonian Democracy, the Age of Jackson, and in the wake of the Dred Scott decision, he argues that an essential, but often overlooked, factor is the extent to which the Court’s decisions are regarded as binding—not only upon the parties to the case at bar, but upon future litigants and the other branches of the state and national government as well. Thus, Professor Friedman contends, when the Court is acting during a time of perceived (and actual) judicial supremacy, countermajoritarian criticism will flourish. In the latter two Articles in this series, Professor Friedman will address the responses of the political branches to the emergence of judicial supremacy and the eventual rise of the “countermajoritarian difficulty” as the central problem of constitutional scholarship.

It is rare that an issue of fundamental importance to copyright litigation goes wholly unaddressed. Yet that rare situation applies to the question of how courts should treat affirmative defenses raised by “related” defendants, i.e., those who are claimed not to have committed the infringement itself (the “primary” defendants) but who are nonetheless sought to be held responsible on the theories of vicarious liability or contributory infringement. Should those defenses inure to the benefit solely of the defendant who pleads them? Or should they be evaluated in the context of the primary claim of infringement, and thus radiate outward for the benefit of all defendants in the action? Although legions of cases confront such vicarious defenses, they do so in a wholly uncritical fashion—some adopt the former approach, others the latter; their unifying point is that they fail to articulate any basis for drawing the distinction. Neither do the scholarly commentaries treat this issue, notwithstanding that it would seem to be essential to sound progress in the field. The case law’s failure to address this disparity would give rise to no problems if only everyone’s intuition invariably agreed as to which cases fit into which categories. Recently, however, I found myself for the first time ever disagreeing with how a particular court evaluated the affirmative defense of a related defendant. The case in question is Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995), which rejected the primary defendant’s fair use defense, and then when confronting the related defendant’s summary judgment motion recalibrated the entire fair use equilibrium with respect to the circumstances of that new defendant. To evaluate the wisdom of that court’s treatment of the vicarious fair use defense, it is necessary to take several gigantic strides backwards and to articulate a framework for how related defendants may assert their affirmative defenses, whether personally or globally. Happily, on a recent archaeological romp, I encountered some ancient judicial opinions in which resolution to these issues emerges full-blown from the judicial brow. I hereby present them unedited.

In 1996 Congress passed two laws, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which substantially increased the likelihood that permanent residents will be deported from the United States for criminal convictions. The deportation provisions of these 1996 laws are now being applied retroactively to immigrants who could not or would not have been deported under the law in place at the time the immigrants were convicted for their offenses. Noting the potential injustice of this change in the rules by which immigrants were expected to conduct their lives, Professor Morawetz explores the constitutionality of the retroactive application of these new deportation schemes. Rather than relying upon a traditional ex post facto analysis, however, Professor Morawetz examines how the retroactive application of these laws may offend the Due Process Clause as it has been interpreted and applied in a body of Supreme Court case law addressing economic legislation. The plenary power doctrine alone, Professor Morawetz argues, does not bar the courts from testing the retroactive application of these deportation provisions according to the substantive due process standard enunciated by the Court. In fact, courts may be forced to address the constitutionality of the deportation provisions due to jurisdictional restrictions contained in the 1996 laws. After analyzing the history and text of the 1996 legislation, Professor Morawetz concludes that it would be unconstitutional to apply retroactively many, if not all of these deportation provisions to immigrants whose conduct and convictions occurred prior to the implementation of Congress’s new scheme.