NewYorkUniversity
LawReview

Notes

2018

The Framing of Fat: Narratives of Health and Disability in Fat Discrimination Litigation

Lauren E. Jones

Fat discrimination is rampant in education, health care, and employment. Antiobesity activists claim that it is not only acceptable, but actually desirable to stigmatize fat bodies because this stigmatization shames fat people into better health. In response, the fat acceptance movement turned to science to show that fat bodies can be healthy. As part of this movement, legislative advocacy and litigation strategies have utilized the argument that fat discrimination should not be permitted because fat people can be healthy. I argue that this move undermines the true justice that the fat acceptance community seeks. In the quest towards the fat acceptance movement’s ultimate goal of acceptance for all fat bodies, the movement must demand dignity and respect for all bodies, including fat bodies that are unhealthy. In this Note, I will discuss the theoretical problems inherent in the two most frequent arguments employed by fat able-bodied plaintiffs: that they are healthy in comparison with unhealthy or disabled people, and, alternatively, that they are disabled. In addition to being theoretically problematic, as a practical matter, fat discrimination challenges using claims based on the good health and able bodies of fat persons have been mostly unsuccessful. On the other hand, some contemporaneous fat plaintiffs have won cases in which they claimed that fatness is a disability. I argue that fat plaintiffs who use disability claims must work in solidarity with the disability rights movement, which demands respect, self-determination, and access for disabled people. If they do not, fat plaintiffs risk creating precedent that will make it harder for disabled people to prove their own discrimination claims and perpetuating stereotypes about disabled people. In all cases, as an anti-oppression movement within a broader social justice framework, the fat acceptance movement must work in solidarity with the disability justice movement rather than undermining the legal protections disabled people have won.

Overly Intimate Surveillance: Why Emergent Public Health Surveillance Programs Deserve Strict Scrutiny Under the Fourteenth Amendment

Margaret B. Hoppin

New York City’s A1C Registry is a paradigm of “emergent” public health surveillance: It subjects a population with a non-communicable, non-exposure-related health condition to individualized, ongoing, and intimate government surveillance. In so doing, it employs a surveillance model that was developed in the context of serious contagious disease and was justified in part by the efficacy of government interventions to prevent contagious disease from spreading. This justification for the surveillance model does not apply to the principal present-day threats to public health: obesity and other chronic conditions like diabetes. In addition, emergent public health surveillance mimics three features of law enforcement and national security surveillance that courts and commentators have found both troubling and relevant to the scope of privacy protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment. Like security programs, emergent public health surveillance involves comprehensive, intimate and individualized surveillance, employs electronic data collection systems which have a low marginal cost and to which data mining techniques are easily applied, and scrutinizes politically vulnerable domestic populations. Building in part on Fourth Amendment challenges to, and critical commentary about, security surveillance programs, this Note argues that emergent public health surveillance programs intrude upon a fundamental privacy interest. Accordingly, they should receive strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. The constitutional inquiry should turn in part upon the efficacy of the public health intervention enabled by the challenged surveillance program.

Entrenching Privacy: A Critique of Civil Remedies for Gender-Motivated Violence

Lauren M. Gambier

In 2000, the Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that enabled victims of gender-motivated violence to bring civil suits against their attackers in federal court. In the wake of that decision, several states and localities have created similar remedies, and there has been a great deal of scholarly discussion of ways to craft a federal civil rights remedy that comports with the Constitution. The decision to create the federal provision stemmed from Congress’s recognition that violent crimes against women are systematically under-enforced or unenforced: presumably, the comparable state remedies were also intended to address this problem. Such remedies have received considerable scholarly support. In this Note, I argue that this continued emphasis on civil remedies for victims of gender violence is both pragmatically and normatively problematic. I argue that reliance on private civil remedies to address law enforcement failure reinforces the traditional separation of women from civil society and their relegation to the private sphere. This same relegation of women to the private sphere, I posit, also underlies the continued failure of the state to protect women from violent crime. As such, any serious efforts to address the continued prevalence of gender-motivated violence must focus not on private alternatives to inadequate law enforcement, but on changing the understanding of the relationship between women and the state that underlies the state’s continued failure to protect them.

Reconciling the PROTECT Act with the First Amendment

Rosalind E. Bell

This Note explores the recent expansion of child pornography law and its impact on socially valuable art and film. It focuses on how the federal government regulates “virtual child pornography”—both computer-generated materials that are produced without real children and authentic images made with seemingly young adult actors. First, I trace the history of child pornography doctrine from the Supreme Court’s foundational case, New York v. Ferber, to its recent discussion of virtual child pornography in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition. I argue that modern laws and court decisions have become increasingly untethered from Ferber’s limiting interest in protecting children from physical and emotional harm. In Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court added a key limitation to child pornography doctrine, categorically protecting non-obscene virtual child pornography. As with all sexually themed materials, the obscenity test established in Miller v. California applies as a backstop, allowing the government to regulate material that violates community standards of decency and that lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Yet Congress’s post-Free Speech Coalition statute, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act, threatens to undermine the First Amendment by once again shifting focus from punishing crimes against children to preventing disturbing but nevertheless protected private thoughts. Despite United States v. Williams, a recent, narrow Supreme Court decision upholding the PROTECT Act’s pandering provision, I argue that Congress should reexamine the PROTECT Act as a whole. Looking for guidance in the Supreme Court’s foundational child pornography cases, as well as recent decisions in other First Amendment contexts, I conclude that Congress should amend the Act to comport with established doctrine.

Beyond the Crisis: Dodd-Frank and Private Equity

Joseph A. Tillman

The history of the U.S. financial markets is peppered with economic crises. A few scholars have argued that in the wake of these events, the combination of widespread media attention and a flurry of congressional action has led to the hurried creation of sweeping remedial legislation. Indeed, these scholars maintain that in seeking to put out the flames of panic and financial instability, such regulations have often been mismatched to the problems they intended to address. My Note enters the fore and argues that the Volcker Rule and the amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, promulgated in response to the Financial Crisis of 2008 as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, are examples of financial market regulation that go beyond the concerns that led to their enactment. Specifically, this Note explores these regulations as they apply to private equity (PE) funds and contends that they each bring the PE industry within the purview of regulatory scrutiny in a way that may have negative implications for our economic recovery. While the need to be forward-looking remains present in any legislative scheme, this Note takes the position that we are currently facing uncertain economic times that require a response more closely tied to the conduct that led to the Crisis.

Measuring Fatherhood: “Consent Fathers” and Discrimination in Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings

Amanda S. Sen

In New York State, unmarried fathers have only tentative rights to parent their children. Unmarried fathers, unlike mothers and married fathers, must prove that they are “consent fathers”—that is, a father who pays child support and maintains contact with his children—before they are allowed to intervene in adoption proceedings. While this makes sense in a private adoption scenario, in which the interests and rights of the mother must be balanced against those of the father, and in which the State has a substantial interest in promoting already intact families, the same analysis should not be unthinkingly applied to termination of parental rights proceedings, as it is now. Unlike the private adoption scenario, a termination of parental rights proceeding involves very different interests on the part of the mother and the State as well as a completely different analysis of what may be best for children. I argue that unmarried fathers should be given the protections in termination of parental rights proceedings that are automatically afforded mothers because the law as it currently stands works against the State’s interest in promoting unified families and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.

Reading the Early American Legal Profession: A Study of the First American Law Review

Zoey F. Orol

This Note seeks to demonstrate the ripeness of early American legal periodicals as a subject of further inquiry by reading the American Law Journal (1808–1817), the first American law review, as a reflection of the changing nature of the legal profession at a crucial time in American history. Close analysis of the content and editorial choices of the journal suggests that the journal both reflects and addresses three early nineteenth century professional needs: the need to practice in a variety of jurisdictions and areas of law; the need to give voice and content to the emerging idea of a professional self-consciousness, which some scholars suggest developed only later in the century; and the need to respond to the internationalization of American legal and political affairs, which undercuts the arguments of many legal historians that the period marked an increasing tendency in American jurisprudence to look inward. The few scholars who have attempted to paint a picture of legal affairs in this transformative period have typically focused on the dockets of particular jurisdictions while overlooking legal periodicals. However, such sources can more accurately portray the state of the national legal profession given that a journal editor, unconstrained by state or regional boundaries, can incorporate cases and sources from a wide range of jurisdictions and on a varied array of topics. Furthermore, the fact that periodicals are necessarily dependent on a subscriber base suggests that such editors had to touch on issues of interest to subscribers from all across the country in order to stay afloat.

Dangerousness on the Loose: Constitutional Limits to Immigration Detention as Domestic Crime Control

Frances M. Kreimer

The United States immigration detention regime that was reborn in the 1980s is not only unprecedented in scale, but also in rationale. Whereas immigration detention had historically been justified primarily as a means of ensuring immigration compliance, with a secondary purpose of protecting national security, today’s system increasingly functions in collaboration with criminal law enforcement systems to incapacitate allegedly dangerous individuals for the purpose of preventing potential domestic crime. Regardless of the validity of judicial deference when immigration detention truly serves to aid in the removal process, this Note argues that such deference cannot legitimately be extended to the newly ascendant crime control function of immigration detention. At minimum, Due Process requires immigration detention procedural safeguards that are parallel to those in other preventive detention contexts, in which the government bears the burden of individually demonstrating a need for confinement.

The Case Against the Tax Deductibility of FCA Relator Fees

Jonathan D. Grossman

The False Claims Act (FCA) imposes severe penalties on those who commit fraud against the federal government. The statute currently requires violators to pay treble damages plus a statutory penalty of five to ten thousand dollars per violation. The goal of the statute is to deter fraud by setting punitive damages at a high level. However, the tax law, as currently interpreted by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), blunts the force of the statute by allowing a violator to deduct a portion of an FCA damages award as a business expense. Specifically, Treasury regulations allow for the deductibility of any portion of an FCA settlement or damages award that is paid to the whistleblower, known as the “relator,” who brings suit under the FCA for the alleged fraud. This Note argues that, for reasons of efficiency and equity, the IRS should change its current position and disallow relator fee deductions.

The Child Paradox in First Amendment Doctrine

Yotam Barkai

Courts have increasingly scaled back children’s First Amendment rights and deferred to schools’ fear of disruption; today, children face discipline for even off-campus expression. Meanwhile, in the name of others’ free speech rights, the Supreme Court has discounted the state’s claimed interest in children’s welfare and has repeatedly rejected restrictions on third parties’ abilities to approach children with sexually explicit, commercial, and violent speech. These dueling trends have created a paradox: Although First Amendment principles indicate that children’s ability to speak is more important than their access to others’ speech, the doctrine errs in the wrong direction and protects speech to children more strongly than it protects children’s own expression. Therefore, the Court should both allow for greater government restrictions on speech to children and more strongly protect children’s speech rights, especially outside school. This modified doctrine would be more sensitive to the government’s regulatory interest in children and to the principles behind the First Amendment.