Author

Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the ability of parties in a federal criminal case to discover material from one another and from nonparties prior to or during trial. The language of Rule 17(c) itself is broad and allows for any subpoenas to be issued so long as they are not “unreasonable or oppressive.” Yet, the Supreme Court, in two cases, Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States and United States v. Nixon, substantially narrowed the applicability of the Rule, such that— absent affirmative showings of admissibility, relevance, and specificity for all material sought—parties are not entitled to discovery. While this high bar for discovery does not create major issues for the prosecution, which has already conducted sweeping discovery during the grand jury process, the defense is left at the mercy of the Nixon standard and its requisite, near-insurmountable showings to obtain subpoenas. While some have critiqued the current system of federal criminal discovery, few have focused on the best way to reform that system, without overturning any Supreme Court precedent. And the literature that has proposed reforms to the criminal discovery system has concentrated on altering the text of Rule 17 itself. This Note instead advocates for a court-driven approach to reform and, in doing so, argues that this solution is preferable to Rule reform when one weighs speed and clarity. This Note proposes a novel approach to Rule 17(c) jurisprudence and the defense discovery system by providing historical context for Nixon and elucidating the due process and compulsory process concerns with this legal regime, ultimately recommending that courts use different standards of evaluation depending on the target of the subpoena—be it an opposing party, a nonparty, or the President of the United States.