The European Union’s ongoing “Convention on the Future of Europe” must tackle a fundamental issue of federalism: the balance between central authority and Member State autonomy. In this Article, Ernest Young explores two strategies for protecting federalism in America—imposing substantive limits on central power and relying on political and procedural safeguards—and considers their prospects in Europe. American experience suggests that European attempts to limit central power by enumerating substantive “competences” for Union institutions are unlikely to hold up, and that other substantive strategies such as the concept of “subsidiarity” tend to work best as political imperatives rather than judicially enforceable doctrines. Professor Young then examines the “political safeguards” of Member State autonomy in the EU as currently constituted. He argues that the balance between the center and the periphery is likely to be affected by how the EU resolves basic separation-of-powers questions at the center. Efforts to address perceived deficiencies of the Union government in its resource base, lawmaking efficiency, and democratic legitimacy likewise will have a fundamental impact on federalism. Finally, Professor Young touches on two broader themes. He first asks whether Europeans, given their cultural distinctiveness, would prefer a stronger form of federalism than America has been able to maintain; if so, the American experience is relevant primarily as a cautionary tale. He then considers how Europe’s institutional experience and current debate can inform the American discourse on federalism by helping Americans break free of ideological and historical preconceptions and offering insights into emerging issues at the intersection of domestic constitutions and supranational institutions.
LawReview
