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The path to financial compensation for the wrongfully convicted can be complex and time-consuming. Exonerees often struggle to make ends meet and function in free society, let alone navigate serpentine processes while waiting years for the recovery they deserve. Securing the assistance of an attorney is often a critical step, but too few lawyers are willing to risk accepting these complicated cases on a contingency-fee basis—the only way that exoneree-clients can likely pay their lawyers without outside help.

Litigation finance—an important tool for increasing access to justice in tort cases—could help close this access to justice gap for exonerees. In a practice called client-directed financing, litigation funders have provided a relative handful of exonerees with cash advances, often leading to greater recoveries in the long run. After considering the benefits and burdens of client-directed financing, we argue that litigation funders ought to consider lawyer-directed financing as well. Through lawyer-directed financing, financiers provide funds directly to private lawyers (instead of to their clients), which mitigates the lawyers’ contingency-fee risk and thereby encourages more lawyers to represent exonerees. If more lawyers were to handle more exoneration compensation matters, the secondary benefits could be significant: securing more money for more exonerees, enhancing public safety, developing a more experienced bar, and increasing the likelihood that some police and prosecutors will alter their behavior towards future suspects and defendants.

For lawyer-directed financing to emerge, many states would have to make two changes to their laws: First, state supreme courts would need to interpret their attorney-client privilege laws to allow for necessary information to be shared with the financier without constituting waiver. Second, laws prohibiting champerty and sharing fees with non- lawyers would need to be removed. Even with those changes, we believe that ethics rules should properly constrain the financier’s ability to control the legal matter and that the risks presented by outside financing are outweighed by the gains in access to justice for the many exonerees who don’t presently have lawyers. For these reasons, we believe the expansion of litigation finance for exonerees merits serious consideration.

When an employer violates minimum wage and overtime laws, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) empowers a worker to bring a collective action on behalf of themselves and their affected coworkers. As an early step in such suits, courts authorize notice to the plaintiff’s coworkers so that they can join the litigation. However, employers increasingly require workers, as a condition of employment, to agree to arbitrate such claims and waive the right to sue in court under the FLSA. Courts in several circuits have begun to go along with employers who have pointed to alleged arbitration agreements as a reason the court should not notify a plaintiff’s coworkers of an ongoing suit. This Note explains that courts should reject this reasoning and argues that preventing workers—even those purportedly bound to arbitration—from learning of a collective action is contrary to the goals of the FLSA and the Supreme Court’s original rationale for authorizing lower courts to issue notice. Rather, notifying arbitration-bound plaintiffs of FLSA collective actions will result in more efficient and effective resolutions of lawsuits alleging minimum wage and overtime violations.

This Article frames the problem of capital taxation as a dilemma of the middle of history. At the “beginning of history”—before any wealth inequality has emerged and before individuals have made any saving choices—the much-cited Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem teaches that the optimal capital tax is zero. At the “end of history”—after individuals have made all of their saving choices—the optimal capital tax is generally agreed to be 100%, since a capital tax today cannot distort decisions made in the past. Neither result tells us how to proceed in the “middle of history”—after significant wealth inequality has emerged but while the shadow of the future still looms large. Yet absent an imminent apocalypse, the “middle of history” is the temporal reality with which our tax policies must contend.

The central question for capital taxation in the middle of history is how governments today can respond to accumulated inequalities while credibly committing to future tax trajectories. This Article focuses on three factors—institutions, inequality, and ideas—that mediate the relationship between past and present policy and expectations of future policy. Exploring these three mediating factors in deep detail can enrich our positive understanding of capital taxation’s real-world effects while refining our normative views about optimal capital tax design. Economic reasoning proves useful to this inquiry, but the Article also emphasizes the importance of integrating perspectives from history, political science, sociology, and—not least—law into a holistic account of capital taxation and credible commitment.

The analytical payoffs from such an approach are far-reaching. For example, a middle-of-history perspective complicates the conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between capital taxation and investment incentives: Capital tax cuts—which are typically thought to incentivize investment—may have the reverse effect when they undermine public confidence in the political stability of a low-capital-tax regime. Beyond the implications for tax, a middle-of-history perspective can yield lessons for—and derive lessons from—fields ranging from criminal justice to intellectual property, which face credible commitment problems comparable to tax’s dilemma. The challenge of sustaining credible commitment when policymakers’ incentives are time inconsistent is not just a problem of capital taxation in the middle of history but a more general problem of law in the middle of history.

The United States federal income tax contains a flaw: Because it reaches capital gains only after a “realization” event, it permits owners of highly appreciated assets to defer their tax liability by holding them and refusing to sell. Worse yet, easily available debt allows those owners to consume from their “unrealized” gains while continuing to defer tax. As Professor Edward McCaffery identified in 2012, consumption and deferral through secured borrowing, coupled with the stepped-up basis death benefit from section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code, create an opportunity for individuals to avoid lifetime income tax and net estate tax. This strategy, known as “buy/borrow/ die,” contributes to consumption inequality and, by extension, America’s growing wealth inequality.

In the tax literature, buy/borrow/die has served as a helpful hook for supporters of wealth taxes, mark-to-market income taxes, and the repeal of section 1014’s stepped-up basis provision. But these three solutions merit some pragmatic concern, on the grounds that they are (to varying degrees) possibly unconstitutional, likely to be repealed, or publicly unpopular. Recognizing those practical obstacles should steer policymakers toward an incremental second-best solution: treating borrowing against appreciated collateral as a realization event. Embracing a “realization at borrowing” policy would reduce the availability of buy/borrow/die as a tax reduction strategy while sidestepping the hurdles that other proposed solutions must clear.