Topics

The most common form of vicarious liability subjects an employer (or principal) to liability for the torts an employee (agent) commits within the scope of employment. Under the motive test, an employee’s tortious misconduct is outside the scope of employment when wholly motivated by personal reasons—a rule that almost invariably prevents the victims of sexual assaults from recovering against the employer, regardless of whether the employment relationship created the conditions that enabled the employee’s wrongdoing. A few alternative approaches have reformulated vicarious liability to overcome the limitations of the motive test, which is based on agency law, but each one has largely foundered. The motive test rules the land.

Neither courts nor commentators have adequately considered whether vicarious liability can be reformulated in terms of basic tort doctrine independently of agency law. As a matter of established tort principles, the scope of vicarious liability is limited to the injuries caused by a tortious risk—one which the employment relationship foreseeably created. The tort formulation recognizes that the employment relationship creates a foreseeable risk that employees will be careless or overzealous and can commit torts while motivated to serve the employer, even if the employer did not authorize the tortious misconduct. When an employee’s unauthorized tortious behavior is motivated solely by personal reasons, it would still be foreseeable and within the employer’s scope of vicarious liability if the employment relationship elevated the foreseeable risk of such misconduct over the background level of risk that exists outside of the workplace. Sexual assaults can accordingly be foreseeable within certain types of employment settings, subjecting the employer to vicarious liability as a matter of basic tort doctrine.

The problem of sexual assaults in the workplace shows why the tort formulation
of vicarious liability relies on a more realistic account of employee behavior as
compared to its agency counterpart, which cannot persuasively explain why vicarious
liability applies to any form of employee behavior the employer did not authorize.
Vicarious liability is best formulated as a doctrine of tort law, not as a component of
agency law with its question-begging treatment of motive in the workplace.

Advocates are hoping that employment discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity will soon be outlawed under Title VII. To this end, the Supreme Court is currently considering whether Title VII already prohibits those forms of discrimination, and legislators have advanced the Equality Act, a new bill that would explicitly protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender employees. These debates, however, typically overlook a critical question: Does Congress actually have the authority to hold state governments accountable for discriminating against LGBT workers? This Note argues that Congress does. While Congress exercises its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment under the constraints of the Court’s “congruence and proportionality” standard, none of the limitations set by the Court foreclose the Equality Act’s provisions imposing liability on state employers. If the Court takes congruence and proportionality seriously, those provisions should stand. This Note thus challenges the conventional wisdom that LGBT individuals are beyond Congress’s power to protect merely because the Court does not formally review anti-LGBT discrimination under heightened scrutiny. It seeks to account for the Court’s clear concern with state action rooted in animus, which indicates that classifications targeting LGBT individuals are subject to careful judicial review. Moreover, it recasts the Court’s precedents on congressional enforcement, emphasizing that the legislative record and statutory scope, rather than the applicable standard of review, determine the validity of the statute in question. Under these clarified standards, the Equality Act emerges as appropriate enforcement legislation.