Topics

The modern family regulation system is paradigmatically public. In the common account, the state plays a monopolistic role. It decides which families to investigate and which to prosecute, which families to surveil and which to separate, and which services and benefits to provision for families entangled in the system. Yet, this public family regulation paradigm obscures the role of private prosecution. Nearly half of states permit private individuals to initiate dependency prosecutions. In these cases, private prosecutors allege that parents have neglected or abused their children and seek state intervention on the fundamental right to family integrity.

This Article surfaces the understudied and undertheorized private prosecutions of the family regulation system and situates them within the carceral state. Drawing on sources including statutes, legislative history, case law, accounts developed by other scholars, information obtained through records requests, and interviews with practitioners and state officials, it sketches out the legal framework for these prosecutions and traces recurring patterns of use. This study reveals private prosecutions to be a tool of last resort: Private individuals opt to prosecute their loved ones—or even themselves—after the state has failed to meet their needs through other means.

The Article makes two contributions. First, it develops an initial descriptive account of private prosecutions in the family regulation system. Second, the Article builds from that account to develop a theoretical claim. It argues that private prosecution illustrates the state’s decision to operate an expansive carceral state in place of a robust welfare state. Moreover, private prosecution lays bare the central role of private individuals in maintaining and expanding the carceral state, as private prosecutors increase the reach of the carceral apparatus while entrenching its logics. But even as private prosecutions shore up the carceral state, so too do they allow private individuals to extract support from it. As debates around the utility of private prosecution and enforcement across the carceral state continue, private dependency prosecutions offer a reminder. Before evaluating the utility of private prosecution, we must ask its goal: to disrupt the carceral state or to provide immediate relief to some already suffering in its thrall.

No one doubts that prosecutors may sometimes decline prosecution notwithstanding factual guilt. Everyone expects prosecutors to prioritize enforcement based on resource limitation and, occasionally, to decline prosecution on a case-by-case basis when they deem justice requires it. Recently, however, some state prosecutors have gone further, asserting the right to refuse categorically to enforce certain state laws. Examples include refusals to seek the death penalty and refusals to prosecute prostitution or recreational drug use. When may a single actor render inert her state’s democratically enacted law in this way? If the answer is anything other than “never,” the vast reach of American state criminal law demands a pertinent framework for ascertaining legitimacy.

In offering one, this Article provides the first extended analysis of the normative import of the locally elected status of the state prosecutors who make such pledges. If legitimacy is the problem, local elections can be the solution. That is, there may well be something suspect about unilateral prosecutorial negation of democratically enacted law. Yet that same negation can be justified as distinctly democratic when the elected prosecutor can wrap it in popular sanction.

This Article first unspools a once-robust American tradition of localized, populist nonenforcement of criminal law, best seen in jury nullification. It then draws upon democratic theory to construct a normative basis for reviving that tradition in the context of state prosecutors’ categorical nonenforcement. These moves uncover a before-now unappreciated connection: At least where the prosecutor ties her categorical nullification to the polity’s electorally expressed will, she accomplishes wholesale what nullifying juries could once do retail. I thus dub that wholesale action “populist prosecutorial nullification.” Building upon that analogy and my normative analysis, I set out a novel framework for evaluating state prosecutors’ categorical nonenforcement that is keyed to the concept of localized popular will, while accounting for populism’s well-known downsides.