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The most common form of vicarious liability subjects an employer (or principal) to liability for the torts an employee (agent) commits within the scope of employment. Under the motive test, an employee’s tortious misconduct is outside the scope of employment when wholly motivated by personal reasons—a rule that almost invariably prevents the victims of sexual assaults from recovering against the employer, regardless of whether the employment relationship created the conditions that enabled the employee’s wrongdoing. A few alternative approaches have reformulated vicarious liability to overcome the limitations of the motive test, which is based on agency law, but each one has largely foundered. The motive test rules the land.

Neither courts nor commentators have adequately considered whether vicarious liability can be reformulated in terms of basic tort doctrine independently of agency law. As a matter of established tort principles, the scope of vicarious liability is limited to the injuries caused by a tortious risk—one which the employment relationship foreseeably created. The tort formulation recognizes that the employment relationship creates a foreseeable risk that employees will be careless or overzealous and can commit torts while motivated to serve the employer, even if the employer did not authorize the tortious misconduct. When an employee’s unauthorized tortious behavior is motivated solely by personal reasons, it would still be foreseeable and within the employer’s scope of vicarious liability if the employment relationship elevated the foreseeable risk of such misconduct over the background level of risk that exists outside of the workplace. Sexual assaults can accordingly be foreseeable within certain types of employment settings, subjecting the employer to vicarious liability as a matter of basic tort doctrine.

The problem of sexual assaults in the workplace shows why the tort formulation
of vicarious liability relies on a more realistic account of employee behavior as
compared to its agency counterpart, which cannot persuasively explain why vicarious
liability applies to any form of employee behavior the employer did not authorize.
Vicarious liability is best formulated as a doctrine of tort law, not as a component of
agency law with its question-begging treatment of motive in the workplace.

The law of armed conflict has a built-in accountability gap. Under international law, there is no individualized remedy for civilians whose property, bodies, or lives are destroyed in war. Accountability mechanisms for civilian harms are limited to unlawful acts: Individuals who willfully target civilians or otherwise commit serious violations of international humanitarian law may be prosecuted for war crimes, and states that commit internationally wrongful acts must make reparations under the law of state responsibility. But no entity is liable for lawful but unintended harmful acts—regardless of how many or how horrifically civilians are hurt. This Article proposes developing an international “war torts” regime, which would require states to pay for both lawful and unlawful acts in armed conflict that cause civilian harm. Just as tort and criminal law coexist and complement each other in domestic legal regimes, war torts and war crimes would overlap but serve different aims. Establishing war torts and creating a route to a remedy would not only increase the likelihood that victims would receive compensation, it would also create much-needed incentives for states to mitigate or reduce civilian harms. Ultimately, a war torts regime would further the law of armed conflict’s foundational purpose of minimizing needless civilian suffering.