Author

On February 5, 2022, Russia launched Cosmos 2553 into orbit. On December 5, 2024, the world learned that the satellite carried a dummy nuclear warhead, designed to test components for a nuclear-armed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon. That satellite, if detonated in space, would have the potential to destroy the infrastructure on which much of modern life depends. Although the prospect of a nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon is new, the threat to satellites is not. As satellite technologies have proliferated to facilitate civilian and military operations around the globe, so too have ASAT weapons. China, Russia, India, and the United States have all tested ASAT weapons, which can create millions of pieces of space debris in a realm where anything larger than one centimeter may damage spacecraft.

These new threats raise pressing questions that legal scholarship is only beginning to answer: Does the deployment of some or all ASAT weaponry violate international law? What lawful responses are available to states facing such threats? Do threats from weapons positioned in space meaningfully differ from those posed by ground-based systems? At what point may states lawfully invoke the right of self-defense and use force to counter these threats? This Essay aims to fill this gap. It begins by describing the novel threats posed by the rise of ASAT weaponry and outlining the legal framework governing spacefaring and hostilities. It then presents a framework to determine the lawful measures states can take to respond to ASAT threats and examines the threshold at which states may lawfully invoke their right of self-defense. The Essay urges caution in responding to novel ASAT technology, arguing that overreacting to space-based threats might trigger the very global catastrophe that states hope to avoid.

The last several years have been marked by contentious disputes about which governments represent the states of Venezuela, Libya, Yemen, Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Niger. Such disputes are far from idle curiosities—rather, they go to the core of the modern international legal order. States are the building blocks of the international legal system, but it is the consent of their governments that forms the cornerstone of international law and diplomacy. When the rightful government is contested, numerous questions emerge with enormous implications for both the states involved and the international community as a whole. Most critically, who is permitted to consent on behalf of the state—to military intervention, to treaties, to the use of state assets—or receive immunities? Who represents the state in international fora? Who is responsible for ensuring the state complies with human rights law and international humanitarian law? And what happens if different governments are recognized by different states and international organizations, as is not only possible, but common?

This Article aims to bring clarity to this debate. It begins by explaining the difference between state and government recognition. It then identifies seven important rights and responsibilities that accompany government recognition, ranging from the right to consent to military intervention to the obligation to uphold international human rights and international humanitarian law. It shows that individual states, and to a lesser extent, international organizations, are currently the primary actors in government recognition decisions. Their varying approaches to government recognition have resulted in incoherence and inconsistency that threaten to undermine international law. This Article makes the case for a new approach: granting the United Nations Credentials Committee, through the United Nations General Assembly, the power to determine the recognized government of a given state for all matters directly implicating international law. This approach would bring greater coherence to government recognition and would thereby strengthen the international legal order as a whole.