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In the summer of 2021, a small, previously unknown hedge fund named Engine No. 1 did the unthinkable. Despite owning less than 0.0016% of the company’s stock, Engine No. 1 elected three independent directors to the board of ExxonMobil on a platform of lowering Exxon’s greenhouse gas emissions and investing in renewable energy. Engine No. 1’s successful proxy battle at the country’s largest oil and gas company came after years of efforts by some of its largest shareholders to push the company in this direction, and it succeeded only because of the support of these large institutional shareholders. This case study highlights the powerful role that activist campaigns play in corporate democracy: Motivated by the prospect of outsized returns, hedge funds like Engine No. 1 are among the few players capable of mounting effective challenges to incumbent management at publicly traded companies. Although commentators have written about this dynamic, no scholarship has yet focused on the significant second-order effects that hedge fund activism can have on issues like climate change.

In October 2023, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a new rule to shorten the Schedule 13D filing window under the Williams Act from ten days to five. Although justified as necessary given the technological advances that have occurred since the Act’s passage in 1968, shortening the filing window makes it more difficult for activists to engage in campaigns at publicly traded companies, thereby diminishing the power of the only actors within the world of corporate democracy capable of pushing management to respond to shareholder preferences and tipping the balance of power towards management. Thankfully, the Commission is not without options to address this difficulty. This Note proposes that the SEC create a new filing—Schedule 13I—which would permit activists who are not seeking control, but merely influence over corporate policy, the full ten-day filing window. Doing so is well within the Commission’s statutory authority. Indeed, given the dramatic shifts in the corporate governance landscape that have occurred since the passage of the Williams Act, and the fact that the Act was explicitly envisioned as favoring neither management nor activists, creating this new filing Schedule would help regain the balance which Congress so carefully set when it passed the Act, thus achieving a regulatory structure more in line with its purpose. At a time when the functioning of corporate democracy implicates both value-creation and the satisfaction of shareholder preferences on the defining issues of our era, the Commission must consider changes to invigorate corporate democracy.

As the world reckons with the #MeToo movement and Black Lives Matter movement, within the corporate world people are starting to take stock of board diversity. Pressure is starting to build from shareholders and stakeholders for their companies to hire diverse directors. Although diversifying boardrooms has garnered support as of late, many other members of the corporate world believe a company should not diversify simply due to external pressures and it being “the right thing to do.” This Note seeks to provide a new perspective for why hiring diverse directors is essential—one that is likely digestible to the more traditional, long-established members of the corporate world and our law-making bodies: Increasing board diversity furthers a corporation’s purpose. Placing the arguments for board diversity within the context of both the shareholder primacy and stakeholder approach models of corporate governance, this Note demonstrates that irrespective of which side of the corporate purpose debate one believes, diverse boardrooms are beneficial for a corporation and in fact necessary for its survival. It also advocates for short-term and long-term policies that can increase board diversity and encourage the benefits of diverse directorship to be fully realized.

Modern capitalist theory has been the engine of Western innovation and prosperity for centuries. However, the persistence of the free market and corporate form in the United States has come at a high cost. Industrialization powered by fossil fuels has permanently degraded and destabilized the Earth’s climate, wealth continues to concentrate among a handful of individuals, and increasing nativist and anti-immigrant sentiments threaten our institutions. This has led scholars to draw parallels between the current day and the Gilded Age, a period of massive wealth inequality during which the negative externalities of unfettered capitalism became particularly clear. This Note is situated in the rapidly expanding literature about environmental social governance (ESG) and stakeholderism, looking to past instances of corporate reform as well as the present realities of the modern-day corporation to argue that private ordering is an ineffective and improper means of addressing negative externalities of capitalism. It identifies moments of proto-stakeholderism during three periods: the Gilded Age, Progressive Era, and stock market crash of 1929, highlighting the cyclicality of addressing stakeholder concerns throughout history. It critiques two major avenues through which corporations might consider stakeholders—private ordering or government action—and argues that private ordering’s legal limits and legitimacy problems are inescapable when considering transformational ESG reform.

In an effort to increase accountability and compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), in recent years both the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice (DOJ) have held parent companies liable for the anti-bribery violations of their subsidiaries. Scholars and practitioners have argued that the two government agencies are applying an aggressive enforcement policy based on an overly expansive understanding of agency principles. However, because most investigations settle with deferred or non-prosecution agreements, a paucity of FCPA case law prevents corporations, prosecutors, and even judges from clearly understanding what the correct standards are for determining when a parent company is liable for the actions of its subsidiaries—especially under a principal-agent theory of liability. This Note is the first to challenge the narrative that the DOJ and SEC are improperly enforcing the FCPA anti- bribery provisions. It delineates the ways in which a parent can be liable for the misconduct of its subsidiaries before analyzing liability predicated on a principal-agent relationship and the amount of control required to establish such a relationship. It then provides a novel formulation of the correct standard to use in assessing whether an agency relationship exists, based on the Third Restatement of Agency and corporate case law. This Note then assesses DOJ and SEC cases before concluding that while the agencies are correct in holding parent companies liable for the misconduct of their subsidiaries, they are applying agency theories inconsistently, exacerbating the existing confusion as to what the correct standards are for parent companies. 

Credit default swaps (CDS) are, once again, making waves. Maligned for their role in the 2008 financial crisis and condemned by the Vatican, investors are once more utilizing CDS to achieve results of questionable market benefit. A CDS is a financial contract that allows investors to “bet” on whether a borrower will default on its loan. However, rather than waiting to see how their bets pan out, some CDS counterparties are collaborating with financially distressed borrowers to guarantee the profitability of their CDS positions—“engineering” the CDS’ outcome. Under the CDS contract, these collaborations are not prohibited, yet they have roiled the CDS market, leading some market participants to view the collaborations as a sign that CDS are little more than a rigged game. Conversely, some view “engineered CDS transactions” as an innovative form of financing for distressed companies. As engineered CDS transactions proliferate in the market, it becomes increasingly prudent to look beyond their contractual acceptability to assess whether, from a legal point of view, these transactions are permissible. 

Engineered CDS transactions demonstrate the challenges that the existing legal and non-legal framework face in effectively responding to new forms of market distortion. This Article examines the costs and benefits of engineered CDS transactions on the market as a precursor to determining whether legal intervention is needed. Assessment of the relative costs and benefits of engineered transactions indicates that despite their innovativeness, engineered CDS transactions are largely detrimental to the markets because they impose costs on actors unaffiliated with the CDS market and, more broadly, destroy public trust in the financial markets. Yet, despite their associated harms, legally, engineered transactions exist in a gray space. This Article analyzes the phenomenon of engineered CDS transactions, assessing the capacity of applicable legal frameworks, private standards, and market discipline to address these transactions, and finds each to be lacking. Consequently, this Article proposes a range of responses, including modernization of the existing anti- manipulation framework, to mitigate the harm and collateral consequences that stem from engineered CDS transactions. 

Most of the literature addressing shareholder derivative litigation has emphasized the perils of excessive multi-forum shareholder litigation, proposing various solutions to sidestep the problems encountered in cases like California State Teachers’ Retirement System v. Alvarez (Wal-Mart II). This Note addresses a separate and distinct problem—a long overlooked inquiry into the due process implications of using nonparty issue preclusion to curb what is seen as an overgrowth of shareholder derivative litigation. 

The Delaware Chancery Court’s recent decision in Wal-Mart II illustrates a conceptual puzzle in the application of issue preclusion rules in the context of derivative shareholder suits. In Wal-Mart II, a separate federal suit was dismissed on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the demand requirement, a crucial step for establishing the plaintiffs’ authority to bring a derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. The Delaware courts gave preclusive effect to the federal court’s ruling in barring a derivative action by different shareholders. But how can such a judgment—finding that a shareholder plaintiff seeking to bring a derivative action lacks authority to bring suit on behalf of the corporation—be given preclusive effect to bar a future suit by other shareholders? A rule that would resolve this inconsistency was proposed by Chancellor Bouchard’s decision for the Chancery Court late in 2017, In re Wal-Mart Stores Delaware Derivative Litigation (Wal- Mart I). While the Delaware Supreme Court declined to adopt the proposal, an analysis of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision suggests that Chancellor Bouchard’s proposal may have been the right rule at the wrong time. This Note proposes adoption of the rule proposed in Wal-Mart I as Delaware’s preclusion law, arguing that the current treatment of nonparty preclusion in derivative share- holder suits is incompatible with the strong presumption against nonparty preclusion and inconsistent with the treatment of a related mechanism: the class action. In doing so, this Note advocates for an approach to nonparty issue preclusion that would deny preclusive effect to putative derivative suits dismissed prior to satisfaction of the demand requirement. 

For decades, corporate law played a pivotal role in regulating corporations across the United States. Consequently, Delaware, the leading state of incorporation, and its courts came to occupy a central and influential position in corporate law and governance. This, however, is no longer the case: The compositional shift in equity markets from retail to institutional ownership has relocated regulatory power over corporations from courts to markets. Corporate law has, as a result, and as illustrated by the declined role of the Delaware courts, lost its pride of place and is now eclipsed by shareholder activism.

What explains the connection between the rise of institutional ownership and the death of corporate law? We answer this question by unpacking the relationship between market dynamics and the role of corporate law. Our analysis uncovers a critical, yet hitherto unnoticed, insight: The more competent shareholders become, the less important corporate law will be. Increases in shareholder competence reduce management agency costs, intensify market actors’ preference for private ordering outside of courts, and, ultimately, drive corporate law into the shadow.

This article identifies a profound and previously overlooked incentive for excessive risk- taking by infrastructure providers. The magnitude and critical nature of infrastructure implies that negative externalities potentially far exceed the net assets of the infrastructure provider. The nonconsensual relationship of infrastructure providers with their stakeholders implies that excessive risks cannot be contracted for and incorporated into price. Shareholders of infrastructure providers thus develop asymmetric preferences towards excessive risk-taking: They could gain from risks if things go well but are shielded by limited liability rules if things do not. The article identifies this moral hazard and terms it “The Infrastructure Ratchet Effect.”

This Article shows that normal market forces and legal mechanisms fail to counter these distorted incentives in infrastructure providers: Regulation, reputation, litigation, and debt pricing all fail to deter excessive risk-taking in infrastructure. Project finance, leverage, executive compensation, and behavioral tendencies exacerbate the problem.

To illustrate the infrastructure ratchet effect, this Article presents the 2017 data breach at Equifax as a case study, arguing that Equifax is a data public utility and should be considered an infrastructure provider. It surveys the events leading to the massive Equifax data breach and shows that despite cataclysmic implications, Equifax eschewed adequate controls to ensure the security of its data. This Article proposes the infrastructure ratchet effect as a possible explanation for this series of events.

In addition to shedding new light on the infrastructure ratchet effect as a potential source of cataclysmic risks caused by infrastructure providers, this Article considers possible tools to tackle these distorted incentives. Insight is drawn from literature surrounding banking-risk regulation, where a similar moral hazard is well understood.

Venture capitalists investing in U.S. startups typically receive preferred stock and extensive control rights. Various explanations for each of these arrangements have been offered. However, scholars have failed to notice that these arrangements, when combined, often lead to a highly unusual corporate governance structure: one where preferred shareholders, rather than common shareholders, control the board and therefore the firm itself The purpose of this Article is threefold: (1) to highlight the unusual governance structure of these VC-backed startups; (2) to show that preferred shareholder control can give rise to potentially large agency costs; and (3) to suggest legal reforms that may help VCs and entrepreneurs reduce these agency costs and improve corporate governance in startups.

The valuation of a pharmaceutical company often depends on its ability to bring a drug to market, making information about the likelihood of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval critical to investors and a highly sensitive issue for the company. Since the FDA drug approval process is not public, investors must rely on company disclosures to evaluate the likelihood of FDA approval. Currently, the FDA will not disclose the content of action letters sent to sponsor companies, giving company executives dangerous discretion over whether to disclose the information and how to present it. This discretion, coupled with a lack of oversight over the content of the disclosures, has resulted in several recent cases of fraud among pharmaceutical companies. As a way to curb such company discretion and prevent future fraud, this Note proposes mandatory public disclosure of action letters sent by the FDA to sponsor companies.