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In light of the Supreme Court retrenching on certain rights in recent years, more Americans are paying attention to state constitutions. This moment therefore offers an opportunity to explain why scholars, lawyers, and ordinary citizens should take state constitutions as seriously as they do the U.S. Constitution, and consider studying them an intellectually rewarding and important endeavor. In this essay, I attempt to do that. Earlier in our history, state constitutions helped define what it meant to be American. Through the process of drafting and interpreting constitutions, prior generations decided what popular sovereignty meant, who qualified as part of “the people,” and what “liberty” meant. The U.S. Constitution has proven resistant to change because of its difficult amendment process. But state constitutions are in the process of changing as we speak. Engaging with them gives us an opportunity to decide questions like what popular sovereignty and liberty mean in the twenty- first century. That is to say, studying state constitutions allows us to contribute to the ongoing discussion about what America means in the twenty-first century in a way no other area of law does. In this essay, I also argue that there are three practical benefits to approaching state constitutions from this perspective: (1) increasing respect for state constitutions; (2) ensuring constitutional stability and avoiding constitutional crisis; and (3) preserving American democracy.

Longstanding constitutional commitments appear to ensure rights to remedies for “every person.” Nonetheless, courts were once exclusionary institutions contributing to the maintenance of racialized status hierarchies. Twentieth-century civil rights movements pushed courts into recognizing the authority of diverse claimants to pursue their claims. These movements also succeeded in legislatures, which invested in making constitutional obligations real through statutory entitlements, jurisdictional grants, and funding for tens of hundreds of courthouses, judgeships, and staff.

Courts thus became icons of government commitments to legal remedies, as well as battlegrounds about the authority of government to regulate power, both public and private. In this essay, I explore how the federal courts became the source of “our common intellectual heritage,” why it is difficult to bring sustained attention to state courts, and why doing so has become pressing as economic inequalities in state and federal courts undermine adjudication’s legitimacy.

Many of the new rights-holders had limited resources. Asymmetries in dispute resolution make aspirations to provide fair and equal treatment difficult. Because courts are public sites, the disparities are patent—bringing to the fore the problems facing litigants and courts. For some, responses lie in augmenting the capacity of courts to make good on their promises as information-forcing, conflict-exposing, and information-disseminating institutions. For others, the goal is to limit access to courts and undercut the legitimacy of their processes and outcomes. Illustrative is “Judicial Hellholes,” which is the name of a yearly publication attacking jurisdictions in which plaintiffs succeed in obtaining remedies.

To clarify the normative stakes of conflicts over “rights to remedies” in “open” courts, I focus here on the infrastructure of state and of federal courts and data on users and needs. Filings in both federal and state courts have, in recent years, declined, while concerns about self-represented litigants and the inaccessibility of courts have risen. I argue that the legal academy needs to take on “class” (as in economic wherewithal) in courts and that Congress needs to provide fiscal support for both federal and state courts, on which enforcement of law depends, and I address the challenges of
doing so.

In Moore v. Harper, the Supreme Court rejected the extreme proposition that state legislatures operate free from state constitutional constraints and judicial review when they regulate federal elections. The Court, however, left open the possibility that a state court might run afoul of the federal Constitution if, in striking down or construing state election law, it exceeds “the ordinary bounds of judicial review.” This Article explores the potential scope of that exception, and it proposes arguments and strategies to guard against undue and disruptive federal court intrusion on state election law. In particular, the Article relies on longstanding principles of federalism to develop substantive and procedural arguments that insist on federal court deference to state courts’ interpretation and application of their own law.